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Abstract. Today, privacy is a key concept. It is also one which is rapidly evolving with technological advances, and there is
no consensus on a single definition for it. In fact, the concept of privacy has been defined in many different ways, ranging
from the “right to be left alone” to being a “commodity” that can be bought and sold. In the same time, powerful Ambient
Intelligence (AmI) systems are being developed, that deploy context-aware, personalised, adaptive and anticipatory services. In
such systems personal data is vastly collected, stored, and distributed, making privacy preservation a critical issue. The human-
centred focus of AmI systems has prompted the introduction of new kinds of technologies, e.g. Privacy Enhancing Technologies
(PET), and methodologies, e.g. Privacy by Design (PbD), whereby privacy concerns are included in the design of the system. One
particular application field, where privacy preservation is of critical importance is Ambient Assisted Living (AAL). Emerging
from the continuous increase of the ageing population, AAL focuses on intelligent systems of assistance for a better, healthier
and safer life in their living environment. In this paper, we first build on our previous work, in which we introduced a new
tripartite categorisation of privacy as a right, an enabler, and a commodity. Second, we highlight the specific privacy issues raised
in AAL. Third, we review and discuss current approaches for privacy preservation. Finally, drawing on lessons learned from
AAL, we provide insights on the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. Part of our methodology is a statistical analysis
performed on the IEEE publications database. We illustrate our work with AAL scenarios elaborated in cooperation with the city
of Luxembourg.
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1. Introduction
The debate about privacy issues is paramount, and
this is mainly due to the impact of information tech-
nology [1]. Moreover, many different definitions of
privacy have been proposed, but up to now and to
our knowledge, no single one has been universally ac-
cepted.
Currently, privacy is assumed to be a right to be pre-
served [2]. To enforce this right, methodologies such
as Privacy by Design (PbD) have pushed forward pri-
vacy requirements so that they be taken into account
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at the early stage of a system design. Indeed, they may
impact the overall system architecture [3].
Furthermore, the increasing pervasiveness of tech-
nology in our everyday lives adds a new threat: our de-
pendence on this very technology. It is precisely to ad-
dress this threat that Privacy Enhancing Technologies
(PET) are developed. Such developments are also part
of new approaches stemming from the concept of Am-
bient intelligence (AmI).
Also referred to as Ubiquitous Computing and Per-
vasive Computing, AmI is the Artificial Intelligence
field focused on modeling, processing and also altering
the context of the so-called smart spaces. The defini-
tion of contexts is fundamental to AmI systems. Typi-
cally, a context includes any available information that
can be used to describe the environment of the sys-
tem as well as the system itself. Some situational as-
pects of AmI environments however may trigger dif-
ferent privacy concerns for different people, showing
that privacy is influenced by contexts [4,5]. Further-
more, since AmI systems focus on assisting humans
in their everyday life, and emphasising human factors,
privacy concerns have to be taken into consideration at
the onset of the design of such systems.
One application domain of AmI where privacy re-
quirements are of critical importance, due in part to
the potential fragility of its users, is Ambient Assisted
Living (AAL). AAL has emerged out of the contin-
uous increase of the older population in Europe and
worldwide. This has called for new technological solu-
tions for improving the health [6,7], quality of life [8,9]
and independent living [10,11] of older citizens. AAL
has hence arised as a multi-disciplinary field to ex-
ploit information and communication technologies in
healthcare systems aiming at countering the effects of
a growing elderly population.
Today, AAL systems are developed for person-
alised, adaptive and high service quality to satisfy re-
quirements such as privacy, interoperability, usability,
security, and accuracy. Such systems need to provide
services that are not only sensitive and responsive, but
also unobtrusively integrated into our daily environ-
ments [12,13,14].
AAL, and more generally AmI systems, give more
control to humans. In [15], Brey notices that AmI on
one hand, tends to make users’ environments respon-
sive to their intended actions and on the other hand,
provides customised information to ease their lives by
reducing the cognitive and physical effort required to
perform certain tasks. But this gain comes at a cost:
“delegating control to machines”. This brings us to the
following paradox: users gain control by losing control
– as they give it to their personalised systems.
The question of trade-off between gaining and los-
ing control, brought about by such systems is high-
lighted by Bohn et al. [16]. The authors point out that
sayings such as,“the walls have ears” and “if these
walls could talk...,” have now become a somewhat
disturbing reality. This represents obvious challenges
to privacy, which need to be addressed. Recently, a
framework to proactively embed privacy directly into
system design, was approved as the international stan-
dard for ensuring privacy in the information era. It is
called Privacy by Design PbD [17].
PbD has been applied in many different areas, such
as Smart Grids, biometric encryption, cloud comput-
ing, surveillance systems and others1. PbD is based
on seven fundamental principles: privacy as the de-
fault setting; end-to-end security; respect for user pri-
vacy; openness and transparency; proactive not reac-
tive, preventative not remedial; privacy embedded into
design; and full functionality - positive-sum, not zero-
sum. These principles were set to extend the PETs and
were designed to “be applied with special vigour to
sensitive data such as medical information and finan-
cial data” [17].
After analysing the properties of pervasive com-
puting environments that could set apart AmI from
other domains, six specific properties were highlighted
by [15,18]. These are: ubiquity, invisibility, sensing,
memory amplification, profiling and connectedness.
Pursuing this research, and in order to guide the de-
sign of AmI systems, Langheinrich developed six prin-
ciples based on a set of fair information practices
common in most privacy legislation [18], namely: no-
tice, choice and consent, anonymity and pseudonymity,
proximity and locality, adequate security, and access
and recourse [15,18].
More recently, an extension to Langheinrich’s prin-
ciples was proposed by Wang and Kobsa [19]. Al-
together, these principles represent the 23 most fre-
quently addressed principles in privacy laws and regu-
lations. Particularly to be noted, are those related to ac-
cess/participation, anonymity and choice/consent. The
authors started their list by observing that privacy-
protecting laws exist in more than 40 countries, which
typically view privacy from different perspectives. For
example in the US, privacy is mostly self-regulated,
1http://www.privacybydesign.ca: the PbD website
contains more information about successful application examples
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whereas in the EU, privacy is considered a human
right.
As expected, the Web is catching up with address-
ing privacy by moving forward with a number of ap-
proaches, being thereby a step ahead of AmI. For ex-
ample, to encode privacy policies into human-readable
and machine-readable formats, the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) developed the Platform for Pri-
vacy Preferences Project (P3P) 2. Unfortunately, there
has been, so far, insufficient support from current
web browser implementers. Similar approaches, like
SPARCLE [20], or XACML [21], still have to demon-
strate the practicality of their solutions. Their ambigu-
ity, both for users and software, and lack of expressive-
ness keep many privacy regulations out of their scope.
A shortcoming of these methods is the purely declara-
tive nature of their policy language [22].
Currently, major threats to privacy come from per-
sonal data aggregation and the increasing power and
sophistication of data mining technics. The magnitude
of the information sources and the increasing poten-
tial to combine these sources to for example, create
a person’s profile, greatly threaten individual privacy
[23]. This is particularly critical in the field of AAL, in
which users are often not aware of the potential mis-
chievous use of their personal information.
All the above challenges bring about our main re-
search question as follows:
Research question: Which are the specific privacy is-
sues raised and addressed in the AAL domain and
applications?
This breaks down into the following sub-questions:
1. What are the definitions of privacy in social sci-
ence and computer science?
2. What are the privacy threats specific to the AAL
domain?
3. How is privacy currently preserved in AAL appli-
cations?
4. What are the open questions and the future trends
concerning privacy threats in the AAL domain
and applications?
To address these questions, our methodology con-
sists in reviewing existing literature in the areas of
ethics, law and computer science. Furthermore, we
conduct a statistical and quantitative analysis. We then
2http://www.w3.org/P3P/
proceed with critical discussions. We illustrate our
findings with an AAL scenario.
Typically, AAL proposes ICT-based solutions to al-
low senior citizens living at home to better self-manage
their daily activities. According to Cook et al. [4], there
is a tremendous need for research on AmI to improve
the quality of life for people with disabilities and to
promote aging at home. In the authors’ view, AAL ap-
plications demonstrate “the tension found between two
noble goals: preserving privacy and providing useful
smart environment benefits.”
The pressure is also real as by 2040, there will be
23% of the population over 65 years old [24] and over
11 million people will suffer from dementia related
to the Alzheimer’s disease [25]. This will also affect
the economy, since, for example, the long-term pro-
jected total losses to the US economy is expected to
be nearly two trillion dollars [26], given that the costs
of US nursing home care are $40,000 a year [27].
Hence, the AAL domain has become a main concern
for many countries seeking to insure quality of life,
medical care, security and conviviality [28] to their cit-
izens.
In this research, we partnered with Luxembourg
HotCity, the city-wide mesh Wi-Fi network, which has
AAL expertise, to create and validate a number of
use cases from which originated our motivating sce-
nario. Initiated in 2007 by the City of Luxembourg to
build Europe’s most advanced municipal Wi-Fi net-
work, HotCity3 is geared to providing seamless cover-
age across the city’s 50 square kilometres area. Four
new cities in Luxembourg and 10 applications were
recently added. Today, the HotCity network serves a
growing number of cities in Luxembourg and has two
proofs-of-concept, namely in Belgium and Holland.
HotCity reinforces the important role of a munici-
pal Wi-Fi connectivity by contributing to bringing to-
gether better connected businesses and social commu-
nities. One of its priorities is to adequately prepare its
AAL systems for its senior citizens by anticipating pri-
vacy challenges.
Regarding the scope of this article, based on our pre-
vious work [29], we do not provide solutions to pri-
vacy threats, nor do we cover every single aspect of
privacy. In particular, we do not include privacy in vot-
ing [30], encryption [31] nor the physical approaches
to privacy preservation, such as the Faraday cage [32]
for RFID cards, or privacy for vehicular networks, or
3https://www.hotcity.lu/en/laptop/www
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at the level of Wireless Sensor Networks [33]. Further-
more, although our field of study is AAL, discussing
in detail the many ethical and medical challenges re-
lated to patients’ healthcare is beyond the scope of this
article. For a thorough study of various ethical issues
that arise in Intelligent Environments, such as AmI en-
vironments and AAL, as well as for the means of cop-
ing with them, we recommend reading the work per-
formed within the eFRIEND framework [34].
The layout of this article is as follows. First, we in-
troduce our motivating scenario in Section 2. Then, in
Section 3, we present privacy definitions, introduce a
new categorisation of privacy definitions, and a view
on the evolution of the concept of privacy over the
last forty years. In Section 4, we review main pri-
vacy issues specific to AAL, and present a statistical
analysis based on the appearance of the term in the
IEEE database of publications. Then, we summarise
the most common privacy preserving approaches in
Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss the lessons learned
throughout this research, and present our insights on
what lies ahead concerning privacy in AAL and AmI
environments. Finally, we conclude in Section 7, and
present in the Appendix, the supporting material for
our references selection process.
2. MOTIVATING SCENARIO
An important goal for our HotCity partner is to en-
courage social inclusion by providing Internet and ap-
plication access to all citizens, and to foster commu-
nication and interaction among the wide range of peo-
ple in Luxembourg, particularly the ones who may be
excluded from the social dialogue. Hence, HotCity fo-
cuses on senior citizens, who, for example, may need
continuous monitoring and particularly cares to en-
hance their lives in the city.
Leveraging HotCity’s interest, expertise and knowl-
edge in the AAL domain, we elaborated twelve use
case scenarios. A complete description and analysis of
these scenarios can be found in [35]. The selection of
the scenarios was done by the HotCity experts who
ranked each scenario. We now present the scenario se-
lected as our running example. 4
4The ranking was based on the following two criteria: (1) like-
lihood, i.e., the probability that the scenario occurs and (2) im-
pact, i.e., the consequence on human life of the failure of the sce-
nario. As in risk based testing approaches [36], likelihood and im-
pact have been used to prioritize scenarios, from low (value 1) to
Frank is a 70-year-old Alzheimer patient, who lives
alone. His daughter, Jane, lives just a few blocks away.
Usually, Frank visits Jane once or twice a week. Due
to his condition, Frank has installed a Home Care Sys-
tem (HCS) in case he finds himself in a critical situa-
tion, and to urgently notify Jane or his friends. He also
wears a health-bracelet, measuring his heart-beat, body
temperature, and daily distance covered. The bracelet
is connected to his smartphone, which also has a GPS
and a HCS application installed. The HCS application
can send vital information, such as bracelet data and
current location to Frank’s HCS. The HCS has a record
of Frank’s profile, which includes his name, age, ad-
dress, and medical profile, as well as a list of contacts
for emergency notifications. Finally, Frank carries an
RFID card to verify his location. For example, Frank
and Jane both have an RFID reader inside their houses:
whenever Frank is close to one of these readers, his
location is verified.
Today, Frank is visiting Jane. He leaves his home
(Figure 1, state 1) and walks to Jane’s house. Suddenly,
he realizes that he has been wandering about and is
lost (Figure 1, state 2). He is becoming anxious. His
heart is beating faster. He is sweating. Frank presses
the emergency button on his bracelet and an alarm is
sent to the HCS via his HCS smartphone application.
The HCS infers that Frank is lost: he has been away
from home for too long and has not yet checked in
Jane’s house. Jane is the person from the emergency
list whose address is closest to Frank’s current loca-
tion. Thus the HCS notifies Jane about Frank’s current
location. The HCS also sets up Frank’s smartphone
voice navigator application to guide him to Jane. If
Jane does not respond within five minutes, the HCS
notifies the local hospital about the situation, providing
Frank’s Electronic Patient Record (EPR) and current
location. Finally, Jane found Frank and led him to her
house with safety (Figure 1, state 3). Figure 2 depicts
the connected devices.
In this scenario, Frank’s privacy could be breached
in multiple ways. For example, when the HCS notifies
the local hospital about Frank’s situation, it is without
specifically asking Frank at that very moment. Indeed,
Frank could expect that only his daughter is notified,
as he did not believe that his situation was so critical
high (value 3). The priority P of each scenario is calculated as the
product of likelihood L and impact I , i.e. P = L × I . The re-
sults describe the relevancy of these twelve scenarios. Further anal-
ysis can check whether specific requirements, e.g. conviviality, user-
friendliness and security, are satisfied.
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Fig. 1. Frank gets lost on his way to Jane’s house
to require notifying the hospital. Also, someone could
easily identify Frank’s whereabouts, by setting RFID
readers across the city, or by receiving the transmis-
sions of Frank’s smartphone. This could expose him to
have his house broken into when he is away, or when
he is visiting a hospital for some days. Moreover, cre-
ating Frank’s profile in order to improve his everyday
life, could work against him.
The designers of AmI systems therefore must be
aware of the privacy challenges that arise with such
systems. They also must be able to prevent them. Fol-
lowing the privacy by design principles [18], system
designers will have to set up the default configuration
of the system to the maximum privacy first. When in-
stalling the system, Frank (the end user) can select the
choices that suit him well, thus giving his apriori con-
sent to the potential privacy trade-off.
HCS 
bracelet 
Smart-
phone 
RFID  
card 
Fig. 2. Connected devices
3. DEFINITIONS OF PRIVACY
The notion of privacy has been discussed exten-
sively, not only over the last decades, but even since
the 19th century, and appears in the literature of var-
ious disciplines. There is no, however, universal defi-
nition for privacy, and many researchers have referred
to the difficulties involved in trying to produce such a
definition [37,38,39]. Newell, for example, argues that
this is due to the multidisciplinary nature of privacy,
and refers to the difficulty of relating studies from dif-
ferent disciplines [38]. In this section, we provide an
overview of the span of definitions.
3.1. Privacy as a Right
Warren and Brandeis [40] are usually credited the
definition of privacy as “the right to be let alone”,
which was actually a reference to Thomas Cooley’s
“Treatise on the Law of Torts” [41], written twelve
years earlier, in 1878. The need for such a right
emerged from the “unauthorized circulation of por-
traits of private persons”, performed by the newspa-
per enterprises which used instantaneous photographs.
This basic definition remained the most famous as
shown in the article titled “One hundred years of pri-
vacy” [42]. As times changed, so did technology and
its ability to intrude into people’s lives. Consequently,
the definition of privacy had to follow the times and
incorporate these new ways of intrusion.
Solove [43] presented a taxonomy of privacy to
serve as a framework for the development of the field
of privacy law. In this taxonomy, he classified harm-
ful privacy-related activities into four groups: i) Infor-
mation collection: surveillance, interrogation. ii) In-
formation processing: aggregation, identification, inse-
curity, secondary use, exclusion. iii) Information dis-
semination: breach of confidentiality, disclosure, expo-
sure, increased accessibility, blackmail, appropriation,
distortion. iv) Invasion: intrusion, decisional interfer-
ence. He presented each of these activities and focused
on how they affect an individual’s life in a harmful
way, stressing on the importance of privacy as a right.
Some other relatively simple descriptions, like “ex-
clusive access of a person to a realm of his or her own”,
or “control over information about oneself”, even if
helpful in introducing the notion of privacy, are not
enough to explicitly define it. For example, there could
exist many perceptions of the “realm of oneself”, or
the ways that someone can have “control over infor-
mation”. At the end, defining privacy depends on the
problem of defining personal information, or even per-
sonality, notions that are mostly met on social sciences,
rather than computer science. So, most definitions of
privacy, if not all, take for granted (explicitly or im-
plicitly) that these notions are well defined.
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3.2. Privacy as an Enabler
Improvements towards higher specificity include
Alan Westing’s definition of privacy as “the ability of
people to determine for themselves when, how, and
to what extent information about them is communi-
cated to others” [44] and Stefanos Gritzalis’s as “the
indefeasible right of an individual to control the ways
in which personal information is obtained, processed,
distributed, shared, and used by any other entity”[45].
Even if the latter definitions are more explicit, they still
rely on the term “personal information”, which can be
again subjective. The Data Protection Directive defines
personal data as “any information relating to an iden-
tified or identifiable natural person (the data subject)”.
In determining whether information concerns an iden-
tifiable person, one must apply recital 26 of the Data
Protection Directive, which says that “account should
be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used
either by the controller or by any other person to iden-
tify the said person”. Such a definition implies a broad
understanding of the notion of personal data, which
may consist of all sorts of information as soon as they
relate to the individual [46].
Lately, there have been so many ways in which one’s
privacy can be violated, that further distinction be-
tween different types of privacy needs to be made. Lo-
cation privacy, for example, has been a major concern
in the last few years. It can be defined, by paraphrasing
Alan Westing’s privacy definition, as “a special type of
information privacy which concerns the claim of indi-
viduals to determine for themselves when, how, and to
what extent location information about them is com-
municated to others” [47], or simpler as “the ability
to prevent other parties from learning one’s current or
past location” [48]. In [49] some popular applications
(Google Latitude, Facebook Places, and Glympse) are
compared, with respect to their support for location
privacy. Krumm finishes his survey on location privacy
[50], stating that “progress in computational location
privacy depends on the ability to quantify location pri-
vacy” and also noting that there was not a standard
for quantifying location privacy at that time. Location-
Privacy Meter, presented in [51] is an interesting tool
to measure location privacy. Other types of privacy that
need to be protected, as suggested in [23], include bod-
ily privacy, territorial privacy, privacy of communica-
tions and information privacy.
Other approaches to the definition of privacy also in-
clude the idea of a free, uninfluenced decision making
about oneself. Kupfer [52] states that “privacy enables
control over personal information as well as control
over our bodies and personal choices for our concept
of self”, making privacy subjective to every person’s
own “concept of self”.
Hong et al. [53] point out that privacy is a fluid and
malleable notion with a range of needs and trust lev-
els rather than being a single monolithic concept. They
focused on empowering people with choice and in-
formed consent, letting individuals share personal in-
formation with the right people and services, in the
right situations, and at the right level of detail.
Altman [54] conceptualizes privacy as the “selective
control of access to the self” regulated as dialectic and
dynamic processes that include multimechanistic opti-
mizing behaviors. Palen [55] argues that privacy man-
agement is not just about setting rules and enforcing
them, rather than the continuous management between
different spheres of action and degrees of disclosure
within those spheres. DeCew [56] suggests that pri-
vacy is a cluster concept covering interests in i) control
over information about oneself, ii) control over access
to oneself, both physical and mental, and iii) control
over one’s ability to make important decisions about
family and lifestyle in order to be self-expressive and
to develop varied relationships.
3.3. Privacy as a Commodity
Privacy seems to be a culturally relative right, but
this doesn’t mean that it is completely subjective [2].
For instance, privacy is more and more considered to
be a commodity in the US (since it relies on self-
regulation) whereas in the EU it is a human right. To
bridge this gap and allow US companies to do business
in the EU and conform to the EU Privacy Directive,
EU and US arrived at an agreement, known as the Safe
Harbor Agreement. This agreement offers a convenient
way of complying with the adequacy requirements of
the EU Directive [57].
Privacy has nowadays become a commodity [58],
in the sense that the consumer makes a non-monetary
exchange of their personal information for value such
as higher quality service and personalized offers or
discounts [59]. Consumers are becoming aware of the
value of their personal data and are less and less ready
to let businesses and companies, have this data with-
out their explicit consent or even for free [60]. Trade-
offs must therefore be established between, on the one
hand, the consumers who want to obtain goods and
services [61], and, on the other hand, businesses’ ea-
gerness to gather ever more knowledge and personal
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data on consumers to better target and streamline their
consumer base. Such tradeoffs are therefore becoming
part of the requirements of AmI systems.
A very recent work by Li et al. [62] presents a theory
of pricing private data. They provide a framework to
estimate monetary value of private information queried
with a certain degree of accuracy. They define as well
the term “privacy budget” which refers to a limit on the
quantity and/or accuracy of queries that any buyer can
ask, in order to prevent an unacceptable disclosure of
the data for the owner.
3.4. Discussion
Table 1 presents a categorization of the different ap-
proaches used to define privacy that have been dis-
cussed in this section. The table should be read as fol-
lows: We see privacy has been defined in three ways;
as a right, as an enabler (to control personal data), and
more recently as a commodity expressed through pri-
vacy policies of commercial products.
We note that this categorization is not strictly in a
chronological order, in the sense that privacy was seen
as a right in the 19th century, and still can be defined as
such. Instead, Table 1 summarizes what can be seen as
a chronological categorization of the value of privacy,
as it has been understood or used. First introduced as
an aspect of personal liberty, privacy then became an
ability to control personal information, to being used
today as a way to exchange personal information for a
better service, or other commercial offers.
Figure 3 reflects the interest of each definition of
privacy by showing the number of publications in the
IEEE database that contain these keywords. Please re-
fer to the annex for more information about the statis-
tics. Privacy as a right is the oldest and most famous
definition, then comes Privacy as an enabler. Finally,
privacy as a commodity is a newest trending definition.
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Privacy, right
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Privacy, commodity
Fig. 3. Statistics about the number of papers containing the keyword
privacy in the IEEE database over time.
The definitions of privacy have evolved. This has
prompted the need to take privacy into consideration as
a requirement for system design. Therefore, tradeoffs
have to be found between privacy and other require-
ments, such as security, reliability and sociability.
For example, complete privacy would mean, roughly,
sharing no personal information with anyone. Such
behavior would exclude a person from social interac-
tions with others and the environment. Typically, this
is not the behavior that is expected from systems such
as AmI and socio technical systems, where social in-
teraction plays a crucial role.
Conversely, if a person was to share everything
about her personal life with everyone, she may be con-
sidered very social, but risk her safety (physical, finan-
cial, etc.), as any mischievous person may use this in-
formation in harmful ways. Furthermore, in AAL, a
privacy policy with extremely high constraints would
not allow any personalisation of the system and there-
fore users would not benefit from its full potential.
4. PRIVACY ISSUES IN AAL
The pervasiveness of AAL technologies poses cer-
tain challenges to user privacy, due to the sometimes
intrusive nature of the devices [64]. In this section,
we discuss the privacy challenges which are emerging
in AAL and illustrate them throughout with examples
from our scenario. Moreover, we extend our discussion
to the further challenges and issues typically encoun-
tered in AmI systems.
4.1. Identity Disclosure
RFID cards are widely used today in electronic
passports, bus tickets, employee access cards, toll
roads/parking access etc.; practically, on anything that
needs to be identified. In some cases, RFID cards carry
vital information, as in the case of electronic passports,
such as name, age, address, marital status, signature,
id photo etc. In other cases they just carry an identifi-
cation number.
Richter et al. described a way to remotely determine
the nationality of an e-passport holder [65]. The detec-
tion is done at the logical level, by looking at the bytes
that an e-passport sends as reply in response to some
carefully chosen commands from the reader. The at-
tack is able to distinguish e-passports from a wide set
of nationalities. A potential abuse case that has been
suggested, is an automated terrorist attack, for exam-
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Right Enabler Commodity
-to be let alone [40].
-to be protected by law
against the injury to the
feelings, dignitary harm
and reputational injury
[43].
-to keep a domain
around us which
includes all those things
that are part of us, such
as our body, home,
property, thoughts,
feelings, secrets and
identity [63].
-to determine when,
how, and to what extent
personal information is
communicated to others
[44].
-to control the ways in
which personal
information is obtained,
processed, distributed,
shared, and used [45].
-to empower people with
choice and informed
consent to share
personal information
with the right people and
services, in the right
situations, and at the
right level of detail [53]
-a non-monetary
exchange of consumers’
personal information for
value such as higher
quality service and
personalized offers or
discounts [59].
-to empower individuals
to control their private
data through financial
means [62].
Table 1: Categorization of privacy definitions
ple a bomb explosion, designed to go off if someone
holding a passport of a certain nationality comes close
by.
4.2. Location Disclosure
4.2.1. Past geolocation Disclosure
Geolocation can be used to breach the location pri-
vacy of a person. It is usually a problem, when past
locations of a person are stored. As illustrated in [48],
people often do not care if someone finds out where
they were a week ago at a specific time, but if someone
could inspect the history of all their past movements,
then they might start to see things differently. However,
this is not always the case, since, even a single record
of someone’s location at a specific time can cause pri-
vacy concerns. For example, if someone is spotted in
a cancer clinic, or in the office of Alcoholics Anony-
mous, or in a police department, then privacy could
also be breached, since logical (probabilistic) assump-
tions could be made about this person. RFID readers
have been used in many AAL systems (e.g., [66]) to
identify the location of elderly people even within a
house and act accordingly.
In our scenario, Frank’s location can be identified
either by exploiting RFID privacy issues, or by acquir-
ing, legally or not, the data stored by the HCS. For ex-
ample, someone who knows that Frank lives alone and
that he is currently far from home, could easily break
into Frank’s house, or even physically attack and rob
him. Less dangerous privacy breaches include know-
ing Frank’s whereabouts and habits, for marketing pur-
poses, or even for surveillance reasons. [67]
4.2.2. Clandestine tracking
Clandestine tracking is a serious threat for Elec-
tronic passport holders as demonstrated by [67]; The
standard for e-passport RFID chips (ISO 14443) stip-
ulates the emission (without authentication) of a chip
ID on protocol initiation. As this ID is different for
every passport, it enables tracking the movements of
the passport holder by unauthorised parties. Tracking
is possible even if the data on the chip cannot be read.
Clandestine tracking is a serious threat in AmI scenar-
ios when the patient wears RFID tags or GPS devices.
Individuals carrying unique tags can be monitored
and their location revealed if the monitoring agency
knows the tags associated with those individuals [68].
A tag reader at a fixed location could track RFID-
labeled clothes or banknotes carried by people passing
by. Correlating data from multiple tag reader locations
could track movement, social interactions, and finan-
cial transactions [69].
In our scenario, we have considered the simplest
case, in which Frank’s RFID card just carries an ID
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number. Of course, this id number can be easily as-
sociated to Frank, since he is the only one who holds
this specific card. If Frank simply passes by an RFID
reader, placed by an adversary, similar to the one that
he has in his house or the one in Jane’s house, then he
could easily be identified at the place of this reader.
4.3. Inventorying
In his survey [70], Juels analyses how RFID raises
a main privacy concern: inventorying. When an RFID
tag has information about the manufacturer, or the
cardholder, then the bearers of this tag are subject to in-
ventorying. This means that an adversary could know,
for example, the contents of one’s bag, the amount of
money he carries, the type of medication he carries,
and therefore what illness he may suffer from, where
he shops, his accessory preferences etc.
4.4. Sensitive information disclosure
Lately, there has been a significant increase in the
digital medical data being recorded by healthcare or-
ganisations. “While the healthcare industry has ben-
efited from information sharing, patients are increas-
ingly concerned about invasion of their privacy by
these practices. These growing concerns on privacy led
to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) in 2001 and have increased compliance
requirements for health-care organisations” [71].
Vital information for Frank’s health is stored and ex-
changed by the HCS, his phone, his bracelet, Jane and
the local hospital. This information can be acquired by
third parties, by using data mining techniques. Typ-
ically, there are three parties involved in the privacy
problem in data mining [71]: i.) the data owner (the or-
ganisation that owns the data), who wants to discover
knowledge from the data without compromising the
confidentiality of the data, ii.) individuals who provide
their personal information to the data owner and want
their privacy protected and iii.) the third party data
user, who has access to the data released by the data
owner.
This third party can be an individual data miner (ei-
ther insider or outsider to the data owner), or an organ-
isation that has a data sharing agreement with the data
owner. In our example, the local hospital could be the
third party, or even a medical company that has a data
sharing agreement with the hospital. Even if the data
sent to the third party are de-anonymised, they can be
combined with publicly available data and still identify
the referred individual.
Another interesting source of privacy breach is pro-
vided by people who are authorized to access patient
data. “Recent studies have revealed that numerous pol-
icy violations occur in the real world as employees ac-
cess records of celebrities, family members, and neigh-
bours motivated by general curiosity, financial gain,
child custody lawsuits and other considerations” [72].
4.5. Unauthorized Actions
As discussed in chapter 3, some definitions of pri-
vacy also include the aspect of control over personal
choices. When Frank decides to push the button on his
bracelet, he implicitly gives authorisation to his HCS
to take action. However, there could be a case, in which
he does not push the button and the HCS realises that
there is an emergency. If the HCS is programmed to
call for help and share Frank’s medical profile, then
that could be a breach of his privacy.
Even if Frank agrees to share his medical record,
there is also an issue regarding the recipient of this
information. Frank could accept sharing this informa-
tion with the local hospital, but disapprove sharing
the same information with his daughter. To avoid such
kind of conflicts, authorisation rules have to be prede-
fined by Frank.
4.6. Profiling
Autonomic computing presumes autonomic profil-
ing, which is defined in [73] as “a reiterative process
of construction and application of profiles, entangling
real time monitoring and real time M2M decision mak-
ing”.
Profiling problems can also be found in the energy
consumption domain. Smart meters have unintended
consequences for customer privacy [74]. Energy usage
information stored at the meter and distributed there-
after acts as an information-rich side channel, expos-
ing customer habits and behaviors. Certain activities,
such as watching television, have detectable power
consumption signatures. The customer has less control
over the use of power information delivered to utility
companies.
Profiling activity for the purposes of AAL is a con-
tinuous background activity; it includes extracting use-
ful information (like user location, behaviour, room
temperature), “enabling the identification of the user’s
needs, selecting suitable services and adjusting the pa-
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rameters of the selected services in order to allow the
AmI environment to behave according to the users’
preferences, actions and expectations”[75].
Consequently, profiling activity is essential to meet
user needs and preferences. In any case, such monitor-
ing and surveillance may erode privacy and since large
amounts of data may be stored, fears about personal
data theft arise. The aim of AmI is to anticipate in-
ferred habits and desires, which means that “one does
not provide a profile on the basis of what one thinks to
be one’s preferences, but that one trusts the system to
infer them and to adjust the environment accordingly”
[73]. As discussed in the previous section (4.5), this
seems to cause a loss of control, because the prefer-
ences and the resulting actions are not deliberately au-
thorised by the final user.
In our scenario, profiling could lead to the same pri-
vacy breach as in section 4.5. Furthermore, Frank’s
personal data could also be compromised.
4.7. Personal Data Matching
Personal data, namely any information relating to an
identified or identifiable person, could be considered as
a superset of patient data. Combinations of few char-
acteristics can be used to uniquely or nearly uniquely
identify some individuals.
Entity resolution [76,77] is the process of identify-
ing and merging references corresponding to the same
real world entity. An entity could be a specific person,
place, building, etc. Multiple references to a person,
scattered through the Web, could be merged to form a
single file, containing all the information that has been
recorded about this person. This could also affect the
privacy of the people that are somehow connected to
this person, or even of groups of people.
Assume that two databases are linked, one contain-
ing medical records and the other containing social in-
formation. It could be deduced for example that the cit-
izens of a specific area, or race have higher chances of
having a contagious disease. If such knowledge is pub-
licized, this could lead to stigmatisation or racist be-
havior against this group of people and diminish their
chances of employment, or getting certain types of in-
surances [77]. Various real-world stories related to pri-
vacy and data matching have also been described by
Clifton et al. [78] and by Frienberg [79].
It is discussed in [80] that 87% of the population
in the United States had reported characteristics that
likely made them unique based only on ZIP code, gen-
der and date of birth. For example, just by buying
the voter registration list for Cambridge Massachusetts
and having a copy of publicly available, anonymized,
patient-specific data, Sweeney [80] could identify the
patient record of the governor of Massachusetts at that
time. “Clearly, data released containing such informa-
tion about these individuals should not be considered
anonymous. Yet, health and other person-specific data
are often publicly available in this form.”
A similar example was provided in [81], which
presents a framework that analyses privacy and anonymity
in social networks and re-identifies anonymised social
network graphs. A third of the users who could be ver-
ified to have accounts on both Twitter and Flickr, could
be re-identified in the anonymous Twitter graph with
only a 12% error rate.
In our scenario, Frank’s age, address, medical pro-
file, health data, whereabouts, marital status etc. could
become available to third parties, by data aggregation,
without Frank’s explicit authorization.
4.8. Purpose Control
Another aspect of privacy breach is discussed in
[82]. Even if only authorised people access personal
data, it is still not guaranteed that the personal data will
be used for the intended purpose. Preventive mecha-
nisms are not able to prevent a user to process data for
other purposes after the same user has legitimately got
access to them. [83] identifies the need of three addi-
tional elements, i.e. purpose, condition and obligation,
besides the basic authorisation elements, i.e. subject,
object and action.
Following our scenario, the local hospital gains ac-
cess to Frank’s Electronic Patient Record (EPR), in or-
der to help him in his current emergency. However,
there is no proof, or automated way (audit trail) to
check that the hospital will not use Frank’s EPR for
other purposes, such as for research, or even selling it
to a third party.
4.9. Embarrassment and Social Isolation
Ageing at home could have a positive impact on el-
derly population , especially when counter-balancing
the negative aspects of institutionalisation (especially
in the case of couples, who are used to living to-
gether and have done so autonomously and privately
for decades. However, the use of assistive technol-
ogy or leakage of disease data may cause embarrass-
ment or even stigmatization [64]. Some AAL tech-
nologies evoked resistance in certain persons because
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of their “handicapped-look” design. Moreover, an ex-
plicit feedback of information of a delicate nature com-
ing from a device in front of other people or in pub-
lic can be embarrassing for its user. Stigmatization can
have major effects on the isolation of the user [64].
4.10. Divergent privacy requirements
An AAL environment typically involves multiple
users with different and possibly divergent privacy re-
quirements. In our scenario, the privacy preferences of
Frank, Jane or any of their neighbours may be differ-
ent; and it may not be possible to configure the system
(e.g. the RFID readers) in such a way that all users are
satisfied.
Addressing divergent privacy requirements is still an
open problem in AmI, which becomes even more chal-
lenging in open environments such as public spaces,
where the number and diversity of users is bigger, and
each user may join or leave the environment at random
times and without prior notice.
Very few recent studies have attempted to solve the
problem either by satisfying the requirements of as
many potential users as possible [84], or by resolving
conflicts that arise from different privacy policies [85].
The proposed solutions, though, are still rather prema-
ture, and many gaps still remain mainly regarding the
automatic adaptation of the system to the user and the
contact, e.g. the automatic detection and resolution of
conflicts.
4.11. Discussion
In this section we explore ways in which Frank’s
privacy could be breached. By recording Frank’s past
locations, an adversary could infer important infor-
mation about Frank’s personal life. Even by knowing
Frank’s current location, an adversary could physically
attack him, or break into his house. If an RFID card is
used, then again Frank could be spotted.
Moreover, if this RFID card carries personal infor-
mation, or if multiple RFID cards are used for things
Frank carries with him, then perusal data could be
at risk. Vital information about Frank’s health, stored
and transmitted by his devices, could be acquired by
third parties without his authorization. Data aggrega-
tion could make it possible for an adversary to infer
Frank’s personal data, such as his age, address, med-
ical profile, marital status etc. Finally, Frank’s own
HCS could take important decisions that would save
Frank’s life, without his specific approval at that very
moment. Would that then be a privacy breach?
This example points out the moral and ethical is-
sues raised by such systems. Indeed, in our scenario,
Frank would have had to previously give his consent to
such decision making process. This in turn would have
been included in the system design, through so called
“Informed consent” policies. A vast body of literature
shows the importance of this area, particularly in the
medical field with works such as [86,87,88,89].
To illustrate our discussion, Figure 4 shows the
number of papers containing these privacy issues in the
IEEE database. Please refer to the Annex for more de-
tails. We summarize our results by stating that the most
studied issues, in fact accounting for 85 percent of pa-
pers, are: identity disclosure, sensitive information dis-
closure and location disclosure.
Idendity disclosure 2147 30.47%
Sensitive information disclosure 2120 30.09%
Location disclosure 1755 24.91% 85.47%
unauthorized actions 593 8.42%
Profiling 207 2.94%
Inventorying 147 2.09%
Purpose control 77 1.09%
Idendity 
disclosure; 2147; 
31% 
Sensitive 
information 
disclosure; 2120; 
30% 
Location 
disclosure; 1755; 
25% 
unauthorized 
actions; 593; 8% 
Profiling; 207; 
3% 
Inventorying; 
147; 2% 
Purpose control; 
77; 1% 
Fig. 4. Statistics about privacy issues in the IEEE database, number
of publications and percentage.
5. PRESERVING PRIVACY
In this section we review the main approaches to
preserve privacy. We first provide an overview of the
solutions being proposed in fields with similar require-
ments such as the Web and then, discuss how they may
be extended to address the additional privacy require-
ments of AAL.
Langheinrich provides different principles and guide-
lines for designing privacy-aware systems [18]. A
summary of these guidelines is presented here:
1. Notice: When collecting data, it is crucial to no-
tify users. For example, it is important to inform
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users that they are entering an area with video
surveillance.
2. Choice and consent: In some situations, it is not
enough anymore to simply announce and declare
data collection - it is also required that collectors
receive explicit consent from the data subject (by
written contract, digital signature, check box.).
3. Anonymity and pseudonymity: Collected data
cannot be traced back to an individual, or at least
unlinkable.
4. Proximity and locality: In essence, information
should not be disseminated indefinitely. For ex-
ample, information collected in a building would
stay within the building’s network. Anybody in-
terested in this information would need to be ac-
tually physically present in order to query it.
5. Adequate security: Use of the best practice in se-
curing communication, storage, etc.
6. Access and Recourse: Trusting a system requires
a set of regulations that separate acceptable from
unacceptable behaviour with a reasonable mech-
anism for detecting violations and enforcing the
penalties.
We have divided this section into two parts; the first
one concerns data that can be accessed, but not in their
original form. The second part mainly focuses on data
access control; namely methodologies and techniques
that enable users to control access to their personal
data, e.g. which part of this data must be kept private,
which may be shared and with whom.
There are also other approaches, such as auditing
mechanisms [72], which could complement privacy
policies. Additionally, various techniques to facilitate
privacy-preserving data matching have been investi-
gated, including one-way hash-encoding, secure multi-
party computation approaches, such as commutative
and homomorphic encryption and split data, Bloom fil-
ters, mapping attribute values into multi-dimensional
spaces, and the use of public reference values. How-
ever, we believe that data matching is just one of the
many privacy issues that arise in AmI, as shown in
section 4, and hence do not further discuss these ap-
proaches in this paper. We strongly encourage the read-
ers interested in this aspect of privacy, to read the ex-
cellent book of Christen [77].
5.1. Anonymising Personal Data
Privacy issues occur when someone’s personal data
becomes available, against this person’s will. However,
there is no issue at all when the same personal data
is available, but without the possibility, or, to be more
realistic, with a very small chance of connecting them
to this person.
For example, it is certainly a breach of privacy
to know that your neighbor, Frank, suffers from
Alzheimer’s disease, when Frank doesn’t want you
to know that. However, Frank would have no prob-
lem if it was publicly available that someone with the
pseudonym X suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. The
property of being indistinguishable among a set of in-
dividuals is called anonymity. The problem is that even
anonymised data can be combined and finally reveal
who X is. There is no privacy issue, either, to know
that a person with the pseudonymX , lives on 24, Mon-
terey street. But if we know that the same person al-
ways gets the same pseudonym, then we can easily in-
fer that the person who lives on 24, Monterey street
suffers from the Alzheimer’s disease and in a similar
manner that his name is Frank.
Fung’s et al. survey [90] provides a typical scenario
for data collection and publishing (described in Figure
5). In the data collection phase, the data publisher col-
lects data from record owners (e.g., Alice and Frank).
In the data publishing phase, the data publisher re-
leases the collected data to a data miner or to the pub-
lic, called the data recipient, who will then conduct
data mining on the published data. In this example,
the hospital is the data publisher, patients are record
owners, and the public is the data recipient. The data
mining conducted at the medical center could be any-
thing from a simple count of the number of men with
Alzheimer to a sophisticated cluster analysis.
Fig. 5. Anonymization happens before the data publishing phase.
5.1.1. k-anonymity
A very popular approach during the last decade to
anonymize personal data before releasing the collected
data, has been based on the notion of k-anonymity
[80]. In a k-anonymized dataset, each record is in-
distinguishable from at least k - 1 other records
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with respect to certain identifying attributes [91]. k-
anonymity can be achieved by suppressing and gen-
eralizing the attributes of users in the data [92]. Sup-
pressing an attribute value means deleting it from the
perturbed data and replacing it with a wildcard value
that matches any possible attribute value.
Generalizing an attribute means replacing it with
a less specific but semantically consistent value. One
can see suppression as a special case of generaliza-
tion, and that suppressing all attributes would guar-
antee k-anonymity. This is why a notion of utility
in the data has to be incorporated whenever sani-
tizing data. Because the utility and privacy of data
are intrinsically connected, no regulation can increase
data privacy without also decreasing data utility [93].
The actual objective is to maximize utility by mini-
mizing the amount of generalization and suppression
[94]. Achieving k-anonymity by generalization with
this objective as a constraint is a Non-deterministic
Polynomial-time hard (NP-hard) problem [95].
5.1.2. `-diversity
However, a more recent work [96], introducing
`-diversity, has proven that k-anonymity does not
guarantee privacy against attackers using background
knowledge, or when the sensitive data are lacking di-
versity.
Consider the example, in which a hospital publishes
its 4-anonymized list of patients daily. Bob, suffering
from cancer, is one of them, indistinguishable from at
least three other patients in the daily list, since they all
live in the same neighborhood and they all belong to
the same age-group, 60-80. They are the only ones in
the list who live in this neighborhood and by chance,
they all have cancer. Alice, Bob’s neighbor, saw an am-
bulance taking Bob to the hospital this morning. Alice
can easily infer from the hospital’s list that Bob has
cancer, since she knows that he is 68 years old, he lives
in this neighborhood and he was taken to the hospital
that day, so he is one of the patients in that list. So, a list
is `-diverse if it contains at least ` “well-represented”
values for the sensitive attribute S. Anatomy [97] is an
example of a linear-time algorithm to compute tables
that obey `-diversity requirement.
5.1.3. t-closeness
But again, another more recent study [98], shows
that `-diversity may be difficult and unnecessary to
achieve or insufficient to prevent attribute disclosure.
For instance, suppose we are studying the test result
for a particular virus (positive and negative). Further
suppose that 99% of the results are negative, and only
1% being positive (have the virus). Then the two values
have very different degrees of sensitivity. One would
not mind being known to be tested negative, because
then one is the same as 99% of the population, but one
would not want to be known/considered to be tested
positive. In this case, 2-diversity is unnecessary for an
equivalence class that contains only records that are
negative and on the other hand, might be difficult to
achieve to cover someone being positive.
Another problem with the `-diversity is that it does
not take into account the semantical closeness of the
sensitive values in each list. To tackle these issues,
the notion of t-closeness was introduced in [98]. The
idea behind it is to distribute the records of the ta-
ble in lists where the distance between the distribu-
tion of a sensitive attribute in each list and the dis-
tribution of this attribute in the whole table are not
higher than a threshold t. This way, the statistics of
each anonymized-list regarding the sensitive attribute
are “close” to the statistics of the full population. t-
closeness is designed to reduce the information gain of
an observer, which is the difference between the pos-
terior belief (information acquired after seeing the re-
leased lists) and the prior belief (information before
seeing the released lists).
5.1.4. Differential privacy
Dwork [99,100,101] introduces, and describes a
mechanism achieving the notion of differential pri-
vacy. It proves that the formalization of Dalenius’
[102] desideratum for statistical databases, that “noth-
ing about an individual should be learnable from the
database that cannot be learned without access to the
database” cannot be achieved. Moreover, it is shown
that even the privacy of someone not in the database
can be at risk. For example, if we know that Frank has
a twin sister, Mary, and there is a database containing
Mary and her age, then we can infer Frank’s age. Dif-
ferential privacy, intuitively, is the additional privacy
risk of someone’s participation in a database.
5.2. Controlling access to personal data
Solutions to privacy preservation based on logic,
mainly focus on permissions to access data (authoriza-
tion problem). Following the definitions of privacy, it
should be the people whose data is shared that decide
who will have access to their personal data, either di-
rectly, e.g. by being asked, or by just being aware each
time their data is broadcasted, or indirectly, by agree-
ing upon a privacy policy. In each case, they should al-
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ways be in a position to control the flow of their per-
sonal data. Covington et al. [103] present a uniform
access control framework that can be used to secure
context-aware applications.
Unlike traditional systems where access control has
been explored, access decisions may depend on the
context in which requests are made. Moreover, con-
text aware systems are gaining traction in literature as
shown by the survey of Chen et al. [104] and the re-
search of Al-Rabiaah et al. [105].
In our scenario, this kind of privacy preservation
would include Frank participating in the design of his
HCS privacy policy, by stating his privacy preferences
for each context. For example, he could state that only
his personal doctor can have access to his medical pro-
file all the time and, in the case of an emergency, this
access could also be granted to any other doctor in
duty. This would prohibit Jane from viewing Frank’s
medical profile. We note that restricting access to per-
sonal data can also be enforced through security proto-
cols, or devices (a simple lock could improve the pro-
tection of private files in a drawer). However, we find
these approaches outside the scope of this work.
5.2.1. Solutions specifically designed for AmI and
AAL
Although access control, as discussed above, has
been identified as one of the most critical issues in Am-
bient Intelligence, few works so far have proposed spe-
cific methods and tools to address this problem. Many
of the early works on privacy specification and access
control in ubiquitous computing were based on the use
of the P3P protocol. Langheinrich proposed a privacy-
aware system that combines the P3P protocol with AP-
PEL, an XML-based privacy specification language,
and other privacy enhancing technologies such as pri-
vacy beacons and privacy proxies [106].
A similar approach, which combines P3P with se-
curity mechanisms for information hiding and en-
cryption, was proposed in [107]. Soon, however, it
was recognised that P3P, which was originally de-
signed to support Web interactions typically involv-
ing e-commerce and business applications, could not
meet the requirements of most context-aware applica-
tions. Studies such as [108,109] proposed extending
the P3P protocol and the APPEL language with ap-
propriate tags and datatypes that better fit the specific
characteristics of Ambient Intelligence systems.
Most of the recent works in the field are based on
the use of rule languages for the specification of access
control policies. In [110], for example, a semantically
rich, policy-based framework that constrains the infor-
mation flow in a context-aware system is built on top of
a Web Ontology Language (OWL)5 ontology that rep-
resents dynamic aspects of context-aware systems and
a combination of OWL-DL (a sub-language of OWL)
and Jena6 rules specifying the policy to perform rea-
soning.
The framework enforces user’s privacy preferences
using static information about the user as well as dy-
namic information observed and inferred from the con-
text. In this case, privacy preferences are actually “ac-
cess control rules that describe how a user wants to
share which information, with whom, and under what
conditions.” This framework provides users with ap-
propriate levels of privacy to protect the personal in-
formation, including the possible inferences from this
information, on their mobile devices.
Similar approaches were also adopted by earlier
works in the same field: a combination of an OWL
ontology and Jess7 rules for the specification of pri-
vacy policies were proposed in [111]; a logic-based
approach based on First-Order Logic proposed in
[112]; and a similar rule-based approach using Event-
Condition-Action rules presented in [113].
Being based on logic and rule languages, such ap-
proaches combine several desirable features, such as
simplicity and flexibility (rule languages are easy to
write and understand as the use a natural-language-like
syntax), formality (they have well-defined syntax and
semantics), reasoning support and high-level abstrac-
tion. Their main limitations are two: (a) being based
on classical logics, they cannot deal with uncertainty,
missing data and ambiguities, which are typical fea-
tures of Ambient Intelligence environments; and (b)
they are all based on the assumption of a centralised or
semi-centralised architecture (such as the server-client
model), which is not adopted by most Ambient Intelli-
gence systems.
A first infrastructure to facilitate the development
of privacy-sensitive ubiquitous computing applications
is the Context Fabric (Confab) [53]. It is tailored for
context-aware computing [114], a common aspect of
ubiquitous computing in which sensors and other data
sources are leveraged to provide computing systems
with an increased awareness of a user’s physical and
5http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-features/
6http://jena.apache.org/index.html, a Java frame-
work for building Semantic Web and Linked Data applications
7http://herzberg.ca.sandia.gov/, a rule engine for
the Java platform
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social environment. Confab offers users the ability to
select different privacy settings when sharing specific
data. For instance, the users have an option to specify
how long the data they share should be retained before
being deleted; and another option to specify the maxi-
mum number of previous values that can be retained.
An approach that is closer to the real needs and re-
quirements of Ambient Intelligence environment was
the DEAL language, proposed in [5]. DEAL is a for-
mal high-level authorisation language, aiming to spec-
ify access control policies in open and dynamic dis-
tributed systems. It was designed as an access-control
and authorisation layer on top of Contextual Defeasi-
ble Logic, which is a distributed representation model
specifically designed for AmI environments [115]. Be-
ing based on Defeasible Logic, it supports reasoning
with missing or ambiguous information and conflict-
ing privacy policies. It also uses two types of prefer-
ences - a rule priority relation and a preference order
on information sources - to resolve conflicts between
conflicting policies. Its main limitation is the assump-
tion that context knowledge must be encoded in Defea-
sible Logic, which makes its use as a general-purpose
solution for AmI and AAL environments rather prob-
lematic.
5.2.2. General-purpose solutions
Instead of developing data access control solutions
for Ambient Intelligence systems from scratch, an al-
ternative approach would be to reuse methodologies,
tools and guidelines that have been designed for other
domains with similar requirements and needs, such as
the Web, and adapting them to the special characteris-
tics of Ambient Intelligence environments. Below, we
review some general-purpose solutions, most of which
are based on logic-based methodologies for the speci-
fication of access control policies.
PROTUNE (Provisional Trust Negotiation) [116] is
a system for specifying and cooperatively enforcing
security and privacy policies. It relies on logic pro-
gramming for representing policies and for reasoning
with and about them. The use of set of Horn rules for
policies together with ontologies provides the advan-
tage of well-defined semantics and machine interop-
erability, hence allowing for automated negotiations.
Furthermore, it enables a straightforward integration
with the ontology-based models for context represen-
tation that are used by most current AmI and AAL sys-
tems.
In PROTUNE, policies are sets of Horn rules, on
which the system has to perform several kinds of sym-
bolic manipulations such as deduction, abduction, and
filtering. Policies are monotonic in the sense that, as
more credentials are released and more actions exe-
cuted, the set of permissions does not decrease. PRO-
TUNE also introduces a mechanism for answering
why, why-not, how-to, and what-if queries on rule-
based policies.
This mechanism aims to help common users be-
come aware of the policy applied by the systems they
interact with and even take control over it. This is a key
requirement for the establishment of trust in the inter-
actions between users and Ambient Intelligence sys-
tems, which is essential for the adoption and success
of such systems. Regarding its deployment in AmI and
AAL environments, the main limitation of PROTUNE
is its inability to deal with the several types of uncer-
tainty that characterise such environments, e.g. incom-
plete, imprecise or ambiguous context data and unreli-
able wireless connections between devices.
Casper [117] is a framework in which mobile users
can entertain location-based services without the need
to disclose their exact private location information.
Mobile users register with Casper by a user-specified
privacy profile. Casper has two main components, the
location anonymiser and the privacy-aware query pro-
cessor. The location anonymiser acts as a third trusted
party that blurs the exact location information of each
user into a cloaked spatial area that matches the user
privacy profile. The privacy-aware query processor
is embedded into traditional location-based database
servers to tune their functionalities to be privacy-aware
by dealing with cloaked spatial areas rather than exact
point information. Another approach to protect loca-
tion privacy, while providing exact location-based ser-
vices, is by frequently changing pseudonyms of users
[48].
The logic-based approaches proposed in [118,119,
120] enable the representation and reasoning about
policies, credentials, and requests in distributed autho-
risation. In all these works, authorisation is defined as
”the process of specifying an access control policy that
is used to determine whether a requester, with a given
valid identity, is permitted to consume a particular re-
quested service”. They also support delegation of au-
thorisation, enabling entities to delegate the authority
over an attribute to another entity, i.e., the entity trusts
another entity’s judgment about the attribute.
This feature is particularly important for domains
such as the Web (that they were originally designed
for) but also for Ambient Intelligence, where many of
the interacting entities are unknown to each other, and
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often there is no central authority that everyone trusts.
DEAL, the distributed authorisation language for Am-
bient Intelligence [5] that we discussed in the previ-
ous subsection, was based on the same ideas, adapting
them to the special features of AmI and AAL environ-
ments.
The use of modal logics, such as deontic logic, has
also been proposed by recent studies for the specifi-
cation of privacy policies, but also for verifying pri-
vacy policies with respect to high-level regulations ap-
plied to the whole system. Aucher et al. [22,121] study
how to formally specify and reason about privacy poli-
cies in terms of permitted and forbidden knowledge by
using epistemic logic and deontic logic, branches of
modal logic.
The requirements the authors set on languages for
specifying and reasoning about privacy policies are
that by using such languages, one should be able to:
i.) distinguish between a permission to know and the
permission to send a message, ii.) specify and rea-
son about the order in which messages can be sent,
iii.)specify obligations in privacy policies and iv.) ex-
press meta-security policies. For example, the privacy
policy not Permitting an agent a to Know at the same
time both pieces of information p and q may be ex-
pressed as follows: ¬PKa(p ∧ q). The logic of [121]
then adds dynamics to this statement, by using the
[sendφ] operator, which reads as “information φ is
sent to the agent”. This addition allows the inference
of the formula Kap → ¬P [send q], read as: “if agent
aKnows p, then sending q to agent a is not Permitted”.
The Coprelobri (computers and privacy regulations:
the logical bridge) project [22], is built on top of a log-
ical language that can be used to represent and rea-
son on privacy policies. It may be used to provide
writing assistance to lawyers in charge of specifying
privacy policies, regulations and law. It may also be
used to check that a given policy is compliant with
a set of high-level regulations. Deontic Logic for Pri-
vacy (DLP logic) [122] is a normal deontic tempo-
ral language, which can represent information about
personal data usage and protection. DLP can deal
with deontico-temporal notions which are prominent
in privacy-related regulations.
Collaboration and privacy are two competing con-
cepts, which are both very relevant to Ambient Intelli-
gence. Kanovich et al. [123] discuss the interplay be-
tween confidentiality, or policy compliance, and goal
reachability. The authors focus on the research ques-
tion whether the agents can achieve their common goal
while having some confidentiality guarantees. “The
main confidentiality concern is that data might become
available or visible to an agent who is prohibited from
viewing it according to one of the policies.” It is as-
sumed that each agent has a data confidentiality policy,
which specifies which pieces of data other agents are
prohibited from learning. Affine Logic (AL) is used to
model the reachability of partial goals, because it al-
lows working with the relevant resources in arbitrary
contexts.
Among the several non-logical approaches that have
been proposed for the problems of privacy preservation
and data access control, we distinguish trust manage-
ment systems, such as PolicyMaker [124], KeyNote
[125], REFEREE [126] and SPKI/SDSI [127], which
focus on aspects of trust, such as access control and
authorization; and the Personal Data Stream (PDS)
framework proposed in [128]. PDS is designed to give
users new data management tools, based on three foun-
dational design principles: privacy of participants, data
legibility, and engagement of participants throughout
the data life cycle. With the PDS, the participants are
in control of their data, able to make privacy deci-
sions. A prerequisite for this approach is that partici-
pants should be able to understand what the data mean
and reveal about them. Compared to logic-based solu-
tions, the main limitations of such approaches are the
lack of formal declarative semantics and the limited
expressive capabilities.
5.3. Discussion
We first want to emphasise again that the two main
approaches presented in this section to preserve pri-
vacy, serve the different purposes. Namely, data mask-
ing / anonymising is typically used when personal data
is expected to be accessed by third parties. For exam-
ple, a hospital that wants to share scientific data, based
on patient records, while at the same time preserve the
patients’ privacies, would use one of these solutions.
In other words data masking is all about what kind of
data third parties have access to.
On the other hand, the data access control problem
is about deciding who has access to personal, typi-
cally not anonymised data. Although, it has been iden-
tified as one of the most critical issues in Ambient
Intelligence, and particularly AAL, there is no gen-
eral framework yet; only domain-specific solutions de-
signed for the specific needs and requirements of indi-
vidual systems. The logic-based approaches proposed
in [110,112,111,113], for example, are based on sim-
plifying assumptions, such as perfect knowledge of
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context, which are not valid in Ambient Intelligence
environments. DEAL [5] may not serve as a generic
solution as well, as it makes specific restricting as-
sumptions about the representation model.
The general-purpose solutions that we presented in
5.2.2 address different facets of the same problem.
Frameworks, such as Protune [116], provide ways to
semantically represent and reason about privacy poli-
cies, enabling also the provision of explanations as a
means for the establishment of trust, which is a key
requirement for the success of Ambient Intelligence
systems such as AAL systems. Approaches, such as
those proposed in [118,119,120], enable distributed
authorisation and delegation, which are also essential
given the open, dynamic and distributed nature of AmI
environments. The modal-logics-based approaches of
[22,121,122] enable a form of centralised control by
verifying distributed privacy policies with respect to a
set of norms applied to the overall system. Combining
all these different aspects in a single logic-based pri-
vacy framework will lead to a general-purpose frame-
work for Ambient Intelligence and AAL.
A combination of anonymising and authorisation
approaches would also be useful, as it would enable
users to have control of any type of data, including
anonymised and encrypted data, adding another layer
of privacy control. Figure 6 shows the number of pa-
pers studying these privacy preservation techniques in
the IEEE database; refer to the Annex for more details.
k-anonymity is the most popular.
k-anonymity 248
l-diversity 85
t-closeness 10
Differential privacy 49
P3P-like 43
Deontic logic/ Modal logic 30
OWL 70
k-anonymity; 
248; 46% 
l-diversity ; 85; 
16% 
t-closeness; 10; 
2% 
Differential 
privacy; 49; 9% 
P3P-like; 43; 8% 
Deontic logic/ 
Modal logic; 30; 
6% 
OWL; 70; 13% 
Fig. 6. Statistics about privacy preserving techniques in the IEEE
database, number of publications and percentage.
6. LESSONS LEARNED, GAPS, AND FUTURE
PERSPECTIVES IN THE AAL DOMAIN
In this section, we draw the lessons learned from the
fields of AAL, highlight the gaps we identified, and
present insights on the future of privacy in AmI sys-
tems and AAL.
6.1. Defining and quantifying privacy
First, we observe that, even though privacy has been
a concern for people for over a century, it is a con-
cept that has not yet been formally defined in a way
that would be globally accepted. Moreover, depend-
ing on the chosen definition, privacy can be breached
in multiple manners. (i.e. location privacy, patient pri-
vacy, profiling etc). In the evolution of the concept,
privacy is becoming a commodity, exchanged for bet-
ter, more personalised services. Privacy policies, pref-
erences and agreements replace data protection legis-
lations.
Then, we note that, except for the recent work by
Allessandro Acquisti et al. [129], there is little research
done on how to generally quantify privacy and more
specifically how to measure the monetary value of pri-
vate information, for example when it is somehow
anonymised. An interesting open question is regarding
the trade-offs between on one hand utility and privacy,
and on the other hand privacy and risk. Furthermore,
there is a lack of tools and frameworks to allow users
to trade, in a public market, their private information
collected in AmI and AAL systems, for some goods
and services with third parties.
Furthermore, most of the current work in the pri-
vacy domain focuses on how to anonymise the col-
lected data before publishing it [93]. Anonymisation
however, is not enough to protect vital personal infor-
mation. Anonymised data can easily be aggregated and
combined (e.g. by data mining techniques or simply by
knowing some personal information about someone)
and thus become de-anonymised. Furthermore, autho-
risation does not guarantee that if data is leaked, it will
not be harmful to the individuals. Even if anonymisa-
tion and authorisation policies work properly, it should
be guaranteed that any personal information is used for
the intended purpose by those who have access to it.
6.2. Principles and guidelines for privacy
preservation
We recall that a decade ago, Langheinrich tried to
build a roadmap for AmI system designers, who want
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to respect their users’ privacies, and updates need to
be made to fill the gaps. Anonymity, as well as secu-
rity, have been extensively studied. However, only a
small percentage of the literature deals with the issues
of profiling, inventorying, and purpose control, linked
to Lanheinrich’s sixth principle regarding access and
recourse. More specifically, this sixth principle should
encourage AmI and AAL systems designers to:
– only collect data for a well-defined purpose (no
in-advance storage),
– only collect data relevant for the purpose (not
more), and
– only keep data as long as it is necessary for the
purpose.
However, and as mentioned above, privacy is in-
creasingly seen as a commodity, making the obser-
vance of the access and recourse principle unfeasible.
Using private data for more than one purposes, even
if this is not stated in the initial user’s agreement, as
well as keeping the private data for as long as possible,
are all principles for maximising the profit of someone
who wants to monetise privacy. Hence, the principle of
access and recourse is in conflict with the perspective
of privacy as a commodity.
In order to preserve and respect this principle, pri-
vacy agreements should become easier for users to
read and understand, and more flexible for them to use.
For example, instead of asking users whether they ac-
cept all the terms of the policy agreement, users should
also have the ability and the means to select some of
them, or even to include additional ones. This would
be particularly useful for AAL systems, as users typi-
cally have different kinds of medical conditions, which
need specific attentions and requirements.
This brings up the importance of creating guidelines
for AmI in general and AAL systems in particular,
now. They would include the development of ”privacy
friendly” operating systems and devices, so that smart
devices do not remain ”black boxes” to their owners.
In fact, no one wants these now ubiquitous devices that
we carry with us everywhere, from our home to our of-
fices, to be their ultimate spies. Examples of such spy-
ing applications are numerous, e.g. the ones that take
users’ past locations to determine whether some users
have spent time in the same place. For AAL users, the
dangers are even greater, as they do not always realise
the risks they run when they allow for their personnel
information to be collected. Often not aware enough
of the underlying technological meanders, such users
often do not understand all the commitment layers of
the services they are being proposed.
Moreover, with the increase of personal and corpo-
rate data stored in mobile devices, sharing such data
requires preventive security and privacy mechanisms
to protect and regulate access to this data shared by
other users. Besides protecting the private data on the
device, the protection of data used by the services the
device connects to must be considered and enforced.
Protection against insider as well as against outsider
threats can for example be ensured with authentication
to services and privacy-friendly biometrics with pro-
tected biometrics templates.
6.3. Tools and frameworks for privacy protection
In fact, when using third-party services, a large
quantity of personal information is shared. Therefore,
tools to analyse the amount of personal data revealed
and to validate the privacy-protecting properties of
communication protocols must be used. Collaborative
and shared applications must ensure privacy and con-
fidentiality, for example when using calendar events,
and should be independent of any third-party or big
company servers. In the AAL field, a number of appli-
cations show the advantages of connecting the users’
calendars to a number of other events such as out-
patients medical visits, friends and family smart phone
applications and smart home applications for appli-
ances. However, the complexity of such systems and
complications due to the lack of standards is too often
minimised.
Another gap we identified is the lack of general
frameworks and tools to empower users to select the
level of anonymisation that they would like to have for
their private information before publishing their data.
Indeed, currently, users have little or no choice for se-
lecting privacy levels, and it is up to the data holders,
such as hospitals, web service providers and regulators
to select these levels. In the rare case where a frame-
work exists, it is usually limited to a specific applica-
tion domain (usually health care), or about a specific
data entity (GPS location [117]). It is worth noting that
many potential users of AAL systems are not health
care patients. They are people who are healthy enough
to live alone but, because of their advanced age, they
have reduced capabilities.
AmI is very special regarding privacy issues, and
this is mainly due to profiling. Indeed, users of AmI
and AAL systems want these systems to act accord-
ing to their expectations and needs. In order to do this,
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AmI systems need as much information as they can get
from users. Hence, they collect, store, and may even
distribute this information, according to certain situa-
tions and needs, and this is exactly where the danger
for users’ privacy lays.
A crucial aspect of the problem of privacy in AAL
is therefore to make privacy usable for users; it should
be user-friendly, particularly considering the fragility
of its users, and allow users to cooperate with each
other and with the system [130]. There must be a trade-
off between how much privacy the system allows, and
how cooperative and convivial the system can be [131].
On the one hand, the more private the AAL system is,
the less opportunities it offers to its users to cooperate
and exchange information with each other, and the less
convivial it is for users [132,133]. On the other hand,
AmI and AAL systems that share all their information
with all other users offer better cooperation, but min-
imise their users’ privacy.
6.4. Privacy-aware system design
Finally, although the awareness for privacy is in-
creasing, it is still a highly underestimated aspect in the
design phase of AmI and AAL systems. Paradoxically,
it is one of the main concerns of end users. Hence, for
AmI systems in general to gain some ground and be
part of our lives, as they aim to become, privacy pro-
tection should be included in the first steps of the de-
sign.
Privacy By Design approaches provide many posi-
tive examples of privacy protection, with “case stud-
ies to show that systems with no personal data –
or at least with much less personal data – could
have the same functionalities” [134], or that incorpo-
rating user-centred design practices enable users to
make wise choices [135]. Moreover, privacy policies
and contracts must be transparent, readable and user-
configurable. This will help users trust such systems
and focus on what they can bring to them. For AAL
users, these functionalities are even more important
due to the fact that they often are not very technically
literate.
Of course, it is not sufficient that system designers
convey their intentions via the use of privacy policies.
Privacy should also be ensured through strong security
protocols. Similarly, a key-question is the accountabil-
ity/awareness of the user to set up the level of privacy
that suits her best, while still keeping the system work-
ing as intended.
Clearly, there is still a gap in the literature, both from
legal and technical perspectives, to determine how to
adapt this level of privacy and decide who has the
right/duty to deliver the information. There is a need
for research to, on the one hand, focus on increasing
the users’ awareness and accountability by displaying
the risk(s) related to some information disclosure or
the value of this information. Of course this shouldn’t
be at the expense of the simplicity of use and user-
friendliness of the system, service or application.
On the other hand, there is also a need for research
related to determining who has the right to relax or
disclose specific information with respect to some-
one’s mental and physical state, e.g., age, dementia.
So, while in principle the system must be user-centric,
in practice this principle has to be adapted case by case,
and with appropriate regulations. Particularly relevant
is the domain of application and the target users, for
example in the case of AAL.
7. CONCLUSION
With the growing number of the ageing population
and the pervasiveness of Ambient Intelligence (AmI)
and Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) systems, privacy
issues have become key challenges. In this article, we
raise the question of which specific issues and solu-
tions currently exist in AmI and AAL environments,
and how are future perspectives shaping up.
First, to understand how, up to now, the concept of
privacy has evolved, we present the privacy definitions
put forward in the literature. We note the multi-faceted
aspect of the concept, ranging from being a “right to be
let alone” [41,40], to enabling “control over personal
information” [52,56,44], to recently becoming a pow-
erful “commodity” to be traded [59].
Second, building on our previous work, in which we
introduced this new tripartite categorisation of privacy
as a right, an enabler, and a commodity, we highlight
the specific privacy issues increasingly being raised in
AAL. To clarify this evolution, we extend a categori-
sation of privacy definitions following these distinc-
tions, and present a graph illustrating the evolution of
the concept of privacy over the last forty years. The
statistics we present are based on the number of papers,
part of the IEEE database of publications, containing
as main keyword the word privacy. It is worth noting,
over the last ten years, the phenomenal increase in the
use of the term.
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Section Lessons learned Perspectives
Privacy
definition
Previously, privacy was mainly considered
as a right
New development of tools,
measures, framework for
privacy as a commodity in
AmI and AAL
Now, privacy tends to be considered as a
commodity
Privacy issues
Privacy in AmI-AAL mature issues: iden-
tity disclosure, sensitive information dis-
closure and location disclosure
Explore purpose control,
profiling, and inventorying
issues, which are not yet
mature
Privacy
preserving
Privacy in AmI-AAL mature issues:
anonymisation techniques and privacy
policies
Development of privacy in
AmI frameworks combining
both anonymisation tech-
niques and privacy policy.
Langheirich design principles need up-
dates to add the aspect of privacy as a com-
modity and allow users to release their pri-
vate data in exchange of money or services
Development of trade-offs
between privacy, user-
friendliness of AmI and
AAL systems.
Table 2: Overview of lessons learned and future perspectives.
Third, we review and discuss the most common pri-
vacy issues pertaining to AmI and AAL environments.
We find that geolocation may give rise to very seri-
ous privacy breaches, especially when location logs are
kept. Furthermore, while RFID promises interesting
identification techniques, if RFID security is not care-
fully designed, the information stored in RFID tags
may seriously be at risk. Indeed, using sophisticated
data aggregation methods, AAL patient data can be ac-
quired by third parties, such as health care providers
and telecommunication services, even from publicly
available anonymised data.
Fourth, personal data, like any other data, can be
leaked and become publicly available, while unautho-
rised actions and decisions by a third person represent
yet other types of privacy breaches. Profiling is sin-
gled out as one of the key aspects specific to AmI sys-
tems, making it easier to target someone or a whole
category of people. This brings up another dimension
of privacy, one which is concerned with the actual use
of the data by the people who have been granted ac-
cess to it. It is worth noting that among the most ma-
ture areas are: identity disclosure, sensitive informa-
tion disclosure and location disclosure. Furthermore,
it is foreseen that future perspectives in the areas con-
sidered not mature yet, include: the exploration of pur-
pose control, profiling, inventorying issues, and diver-
gent privacy preferences. Due to their often minimal
technical knowledge, the AAL users represent a par-
ticularly exposed segment of the population.
Fifth, we describe the two most common approaches
used to preserve privacy, for example by modifying
the available data and providing authorisation mech-
anisms. Such approaches address two different ques-
tions, namely what kind of data can a third party ac-
quire and who can acquire private data, respectively.
We observe that the most advanced areas lay in
anonymisation techniques and privacy policy. Further-
more, we note that Langheirich’s design principles
need to be updated to adapt to the more recent aspect
of privacy as a commodity and allow users to release
their private data in exchange of financial gain or ser-
vices. We also foresee future perspectives in the de-
velopment of, on the one hand, frameworks combin-
ing both anonymisation techniques and privacy policy,
and, on the other hand, trade-offs between privacy and
user-friendliness in AmI and AAL systems. The evolu-
tion of smart homes, the increasing number of people
needing recurrent help at home and the difficulty of the
institutional healthcare systems to cope with this situ-
ation are all contributing to the importance of research
and developments in this domain.
Finally, we provide some insights on the lessons
learned, particularly the challenges brought by profil-
ing and techniques such as anonymisation. We discuss
alternative approaches to addressing privacy issues,
namely by establishing tradeoffs between concerns of
privacy and concerns of conviviality and usability in
order to provide better cooperation among users, par-
ticularly with those with low level of technical literacy
typically part of the senior population, and between
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users and the system. We highlight the gaps we have
identified from our literature reviews and through our
statistical analysis of the publications included in the
IEEE database, we then contrast these gaps with the
more mature issues. Throughout our article, we illus-
trate how these issues may arise and these techniques
be used in real-lives situations, particularly those set
in the AAL domain, with a motivating scenario val-
idated by the HotCity of Luxembourg. We also be-
lieve that privacy in AmI and specifically in AAL sys-
tems needs to be addressed in order to avoid potential
harm to an increasing population whose members ex-
pect that such systems will work for their users, as they
should, rather than against them. Hence, great oppor-
tunities lay ahead, but they have to be grasped, and in
timely manner.
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Appendix
A. Statistics and references selection
In order to estimate the volume of scientific publi-
cations containing the term “privacy”, we did a search
for the keywords “privacy” and “security” in the online
repositories of the main technical publishers: IEEE
Xplore, ACM Portal, Springer Online Library. Results
are shown in table 3.
Publisher Total
number
of pub-
lications
in the
database
Publications
contain-
ing term
“Security”
Publications
contain-
ing term
“Privacy”
IEEE
Xplore
3,459,155 297,816 60,527
ACM Por-
tal
2,127,336 190,400 61,322
Springer
Online
N-A 268,975 62,759
Table 3: Number of publications containing the terms
Security and Privacy in the major online repositories
Keyword “security” exists in around 8 % to 9 % of
the entries in these databases and keyword “privacy’ in
around 2 % to 3 % . Roughly speaking, the volume of
references containing the term privacy is around one
over four of the volume of references containing the
term security. To select among all these references, we
did the following:
1. Select the most cited and most influential refer-
ences about privacy till 2010: the references in
this category are automatically selected using the
help of Google Scholar and Publish or Perish tool
8, by setting the query to return publications about
privacy with more than 40 citations per year. We
got 77 references in this category. Then we man-
ually filtered out the references that are out of the
scope of this study (social network privacy, cloud
computing, cryptographic related), and ended up
with 32 very important references as a basis for
our study (these ref. are listed in table 4 in the
Annex).
8Harzing, A.W. (2007) Publish or Perish, available from http:
//www.harzing.com/pop.htm
2. Next step is to select additional citations cover-
ing specific topics. We run new queries about pri-
vacy plus one of the following keywords: AMI,
commodity, enabler, right, logic, policy, location.
We manually selected the most appropriate refer-
ences about these topics. We have 44 references
falling in this category.
3. The recent papers (since 2011) were selected
manually as we failed to find any automated way
to select them. There are 36 references in this cat-
egory.
4. Last category contains 26 manually selected ref-
erences, not related to any specific topic and not
from the most cited publications.
In order to get the statistics presented in this pa-
per in chapters 3,4 and 5, we decided to operate on
the IEEE database as a source of input for technical
reasons (other publishers do not allow multiple fine-
grained queries to be executed). We have exported all
of the 60527 records containing the term “privacy”,
and developed a classifier, which takes this set as an
input and counts the number of references that fall in
each category according to the keywords contained in
the title, abstract and keywords fields of these records.
The classifier is available online open source 9.
9More info about the classifere here https://github.com/
securityandtrust/serval-classifier
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Ref. Title Year Cit. Cit./year
[96] l-diversity: Privacy beyond k-anonymity 2007 1503 250.50
[25] Alzheimer disease in the US population: prevalence estimates us-
ing the 2000 census
2003 1681 152.82
[114] Context-aware computing applications 1994 3031 151.55
[80] k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy 2002 1728 144.00
[70] RFID security and privacy: A research survey 2006 1143 142.88
[69] Security and privacy aspects of low-cost radio frequency identifi-
cation systems
2004 1317 131.70
[124] Decentralized trust management 1996 2307 128.17
[98] t-closeness: Privacy beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity 2007 818 116.86
[136] Duplicate record detection: A survey 2007 785 112.14
[99] Differential privacy 2006 701 87.63
[48] Location privacy in pervasive computing 2003 920 83.64
[32] The blocker tag: selective blocking of RFID tags for consumer
privacy
2003 872 79.27
[92] Achieving k-anonymity privacy protection using generalization
and suppression
2002 944 78.67
[94] Data privacy through optimal k-anonymization 2005 691 76.78
[90] Privacy-preserving data publishing: A survey of recent develop-
ments
2010 297 74.25
[117] The new Casper: query processing for location services without
compromising privacy
2006 558 69.75
[43] A taxonomy of privacy 2006 505 63.13
[55] Unpacking privacy for a networked world 2003 628 57.09
[44] Privacy and freedom 1970 2477 56.30
[40] The right to privacy 1890 6955 56.09
[93] Broken promises of privacy: Responding to the surprising failure
of anonymization
2010 213 53.25
[53] An architecture for privacy-sensitive ubiquitous computing 2004 502 50.20
[74] Security and privacy challenges in the smart grid 2009 251 50.20
[101] Differential privacy: A survey of results 2008 298 49.67
[97] Anatomy: Simple and effective privacy preservation 2006 385 48.13
[18] Privacy by design - Principles of privacy-aware ubiquitous sys-
tems
2001 621 47.77
[68] RFID privacy: An overview of problems and proposed solutions 2005 427 47.44
[137] The platform for privacy preferences 1.0 (P3P1. 0) specification 2002 520 43.33
[138] Reference reconciliation in complex information spaces 2005 380 42.22
[91] Personalized privacy preservation 2006 330 41.25
[4] Ambient intelligence: Technologies, applications, and opportuni-
ties.
2009 201 40.20
[118] Delegation logic: A logic-based approach to distributed authoriza-
tion
2003 442 40.18
Table 4: Automatically selected references
